XiaoMi-AI文件搜索系统
World File Search System安全策略
nshield 5s HSM FIPS 140-3级别3安全策略
▶安全目标：Ind-CCA2 KEM。（请参阅第1节。使用单独的模块进行IND-CCA2 KEM之外的通用转换；请参阅第6节。）▶选定的哈希功能：shake256。关注QROM IND-CCA2。（请参阅第5.3.3节。）▶QROM ind-cca2用于经典mceliece的QROM IND-CCA2从OW-CPA基础PKE的安全性紧密地遵循。（请参阅第5节）▶此PKE的OW-CPA安全性从原始McEliece PKE的OW-CPA安全性紧随其后。（请参阅第4节）▶审查然后重点介绍OW-CPA攻击。（请参阅第3节）唯一可能出现问题的方法：涉及Shake256的灾难；严重减少的错误；更好的OW-CPA攻击原始McEliece。
确保SCADA的未来：卓越运营的网络安全策略
数十年来，监督控制和数据获取（SCADA）系统已经形成了工艺行业的骨干，管理石油和天然气管道，电网和水公用事业等复杂的基础设施。随着这项技术的不断发展，风险也随之发展。针对关键基础设施的网络威胁的扩散需要网络安全策略的平行演变，以确保这些系统在实现卓越运营的同时对攻击保持弹性。
2024-哈利法克斯地区城市道路安全策略
Contributors Sam Trask - Supervisor, Road Safety & Transportation Lucas Pitts - Director, Traffic Management Roddy MacIntyre - Manager, Traffic Services & Road Safety Julia Mills - Program Engineer, Road Safety & Transportation Matt Hamer - Engineer in Training, Road Safety & Transportation Daniel Prest – Transportation Engineer, Traffic Services & Road Safety Jill Morrison - Supervisor, Traffic Services Anne Sherwood - Director, Transportation Design & Construction Services Mike Connors - Manager, Transportation Planning David MacIsaac - Manager, Active Transportation Michaelyn Thompson - Marketing Manager, Corporate Communications Liam Mather – Senior Client Strategist, Corporate Communications Melissa Myers – Accessibility Advisor, Office of Diversity & Inclusion Tamar Pryor Brown - Senior Advisor, African Nova Scotian Affairs Integration Office Erin Allison - Supervisor, Transit Infrastructure Scott Ramey – Assistant Chief, Halifax Regional Fire &紧急紧急克里斯蒂娜·马丁（Christina Martin） - 哈利法克斯地区警察萨尔吉特（Sargeant），哈利法克斯（Halifax）警察埃里卡·普林（Erica Pynn） - 萨尔吉亚特（RCMP Halifax）地区区域支队卡维塔·卡纳（Kavita Khanna） - 哈利法克斯地区教育中心迈克尔·克罗夫特（Michael Croft）的运营总监迈克尔·克罗夫特（Michael Croft Coordinator, Nova Scotia Health Ben Lemphers - Healthy Built Environment Coordinator, Nova Scotia Health Valarie Blair - Manager Healthy Communities, Nova Scotia Health Erica Siba - Health Promoter, Nova Scotia Health Morgane Stocker - Health Promoter, Nova Scotia Health Natasha Warren - Physical Activity Consultant, Nova Scotia Health Samantha Noseworthy – Health Promotion Specialist, IWK Health Centre
OpenSSL FIPS 140-2安全策略OPENSL FIPS提供商
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................... 2 About this Document ....................................................................................................................................................... 2免责声明...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................General ................................................................................................................................................................... 5 2.加密模块接口...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................Roles, Services, and Authentication .................................................................................................................... 13 4.1 Roles ..................................................................................................................................................................... 13 4.2 Authentication ..................................................................................................................................................... 13 4.3 Services ................................................................................................................................................................. 13 5.Cryptographic Module Specification ..................................................................................................................... 6 2.1 Overall Security Design and Rules of Operation ................................................................................................. 11 2.1.1 Usage of AES-GCM .................................................................................................................................................... 11 2.1.2 RSA and ECDSA Keys ................................................................................................................................................. 11 2.1.3 CSP Sharing ............................................................................................................................................................... 11 2.1.4 Modes of Operation ................................................................................................................................................. 11 3.Software/Firmware Security ................................................................................................................................ 17 5.1 Module Format .................................................................................................................................................... 17 6.Operational Environment .................................................................................................................................... 17 7.Physical Security ................................................................................................................................................... 17 8.Non-invasive Security ........................................................................................................................................... 17 9.Sensitive Security Parameter Management ........................................................................................................ 18 10.Self-Tests .............................................................................................................................................................. 22 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ................................................................................................................................... 22 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests .......................................................................................................................................... 22 11.Life-Cycle Assurance............................................................................................................................................. 24 11.1 Installation Instructions ....................................................................................................................................... 24 11.1.1 Building for Android ............................................................................................................................................ 24 11.1.2 Building for Linux................................................................................................................................................. 25 11.1.3 Retrieving Module Name and Version .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................Mitigation of Other Attacks ................................................................................................................................. 26 References and Standards ..................................................................................................................................................... 27 Acronyms ...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
alis：不安全输入提示的LLM指令安全策略
在大型语言模型中，现有的指令调整方法可能无法在及时注入和越狱等用户输入的攻击方面保持稳健性。受到计算机硬件和操作系统的启发，我们提出了一种指令调用范式的指令，称为木质lm lm I n构造策略（ALIS），以通过将用户输入分解为不可减少的原子指令，并将它们组织到指导流中，从而增强模型性能，以指导它们将响应生成模型响应。alis是一个层次结构，在该结构中，用户输入和系统提示分别被视为用户和内核模式指令。基于ALIS，该模型可以通过忽略或拒绝输入指令来维护安全限制，当时用户模式指令尝试与内核模式指令发生冲突。为了构建Alis，我们还开发了一种自动指令生成方法，用于培训ALIS，并提供一个指令分解任务和相应的数据集。值得注意的是，具有小型模型的ALIS框架仍然可以提高LLM对攻击的弹性的弹性，而不会损失一般的攻击性。我们的代码和数据可在https://github.com/xinhaos0101/alis上获得。
OpenSSL FIPS 140-2安全策略OPENSL FIPS提供商
Table of Contents FIPS 140-2 Overview ............................................................................................................................................................ 6 1.Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................. 7 1.1 Scope ................................................................................................................................................................... 7 1.2 Module Overview ................................................................................................................................................. 7 1.3 Module Boundary ................................................................................................................................................ 8 2.Security Level ............................................................................................................................................................... 9 3.Tested Configurations ................................................................................................................................................ 10 4.Ports and Interfaces ................................................................................................................................................... 11 5.Physical Security......................................................................................................................................................... 15 7.Roles, Services and Authentication............................................................................................................................. 12 5.1 Roles .................................................................................................................................................................. 12 5.2 Services ...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................Operational Environment ........................................................................................................................................... 16 8.加密算法和钥匙管理........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 17 8.1加密算法..................................................................... .....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................电磁干扰/电磁兼容性（EMI/EMC）...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................Self-tests .................................................................................................................................................................... 30
FIPS 140-2非专有安全策略AWS NITRO卡...
2 AWS硝基卡安全引擎................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6 2.1加密模块规格........................................................................................................... 7 2.1.2 Firmware Description .............................................................................................................................. 8 2.1.3 Module Validation Level .......................................................................................................................... 8 2.2 Description of Approved Modes ................................................................................................................... 9 2.3 Cryptographic Module Boundary ................................................................................................................. 9 2.3.1 Hardware Block Diagram ....................................................................................................................... 10
避免现代信息系统中数据泄露的数据安全策略
结果：分析揭示了几个关键主题：1）安全意识培训的重要性在于它是加强人为因素的关键，而人为因素是数据保护中最薄弱的环节。2）分层防御原则的有效性，它需要结合技术措施和完善的政策和程序。3）加密、访问控制和数据最小化在保护信息和数据方面的作用比以往任何时候都重要。4）威胁情报和事件响应计划可以在威胁行为者开始执行攻击之前提前发现漏洞。5）人工智能和机器学习作为威胁的作用，以及在网络安全中利用数据分析机会识别和预防威胁的可能性。
更安全的萨顿伙伴关系社区安全策略2021-24
这不能单独实现。自2005年推出以来，SSPS更安全的Sutton合作伙伴服务（SSP）在应对不断发展的社区安全环境中发挥了重要作用，并与一系列机构和社区团体建立了动态合作伙伴关系，将本地知识和专业知识汇集在一起，以目标资源和需要。我们的愿景和我们的目标在整个伙伴关系之间共享，并通过参与，咨询和分析共同构建。了解伙伴已经在做什么是必要的，该战略旨在认识并支持提供相关的合作伙伴战略和计划，包括萨顿委员会的帮助早期战略，保护萨顿战略中的弱势成年人，VAWG/DA策略，VAWG/DA策略和伦敦消防旅的团结一致战略和社区安全计划。
要求伴侣文件到FBI CJIS安全策略版本5.9.5
建议更改CJIS安全政策（CSJISECPOL）的第5.9.4版，于2023年11月获得咨询政策委员会（APB）的批准，随后由联邦调查局董事批准。该策略包含从以前版本中遵循的当前要求，以及新批准的代理商要求实施的要求。新语言用红色粗体斜体表示，并在StrikeThrough中指示了删除的语言。“更改摘要”页面列出了“更改”部分。文档中的修改以黄色突出显示，以易于位置。基于“ Cjissecpol安全控制优先级和实施截止日期”，主题论文由2023年秋季APB认可并经FBI董事批准，已对“审核 /制裁日期”列和新的“优先级”列进行了更改。“审核 /制裁日期”列指示现代化安全控制将成为可用于审计的日期。CJISSECPOL版本5.9中存在的要求和现代化的控件以绿色和状态为“现有”。该版本之后现代化的新要求尚不可制定，以黄色表示，并说“零周期”。所有机构于2024年10月1日开始“零周期”。“优先级”列指示每个控件的批准的优先级。优先级1 [p1]在出版Cjissecpol版本5.9.5时立即被制裁，并将其标记为“酒吧”，这意味着Cjissecpol和该文档的封面上的日期。注意：该机构始终最终负责确保政策合规性。该文档还包含“ Cloud Matrix”，该列由描述谁（CJIS*/CSO，代理商，云服务提供商或代理商和服务提供商）组成的其他列具有技术能力，可以执行确保满足特定要求的必要措施。三个子列被标记为IaaS，PaaS和SaaS，并描绘了该机构从Cloud Service提供商那里利用的云服务类型。分别这些云服务模型是：