阿根廷的违约问题：对墨菲的回应

Let me begin with an apology for my relatively late entry into this debate. I would have interjected earlier, but for three months, I have been dealing with cancer and starting a new job as Assistant Professor of Economics at the Panamerican Institute of Senior Management. This prevented me from following content like the exchange between Professors Philipp Bagus and Jörg Guido Hülsmann on mises.org. Professor Bagus recently brought it to my attention, and soon after, I came across Dr. Bob Murphy’s podcast episode on the topic.

我不会在这里总结这场争论。最好亲自阅读。请参阅完整的 Bagus-Hülsmann 讨论。 Listen to Murphy’s Human Action Podcast episode.

I hold deep sympathy for elements of both sides in this intra-Austrian discussion. Ultimately, however, I align with President Milei and Professor Bagus: the risks of an immediate central bank closure in late 2023 were excessive.

To clarify the terms of the argument, I concede two points to Professor Hülsmann—with apologies to Professor Bagus. First, the Argentine peso is indeed fiat money, not credit money. Second, hyperinflation would not necessarily have followed the closure of the Central Bank, provided the monetary base was frozen. The demand for pesos depends chiefly on expectations of proximate purchasing power, not on the prospect of dollar conversion at some indeterminate future rate.

The critical variable, therefore, is how one freezes that base. As Murphy correctly notes, the danger lies in the sterilized monetary mass. In late November 2023, remunerated liabilities (LELIQs and pases pasivos) totaled ARS 24.8 trillion against a monetary base of only ARS 8.3 trillion. This 3:1 ratio created the famous “Leliq bomb.”

Milei faced three paths for handling these liabilities: