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拥堵定价，拼车和通勤福利
New NBER paper by Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz: Building on the canonical “bottleneck” model of Vickrey (1969), we show that carpooling and road pricing are highly complementary in addressing traffic congestion: they can be much more effective jointly than each one separately, and can improve commuter welfare without having to rely on the redistribution of government […]
来源:Mostly Economics在Vickrey（1969）的规范“瓶颈”模型上建造，我们表明拼车和道路定价在解决交通拥堵方面非常互补：它们可以分别共同有效，并且可以分别提高通勤福利，而不必依靠政府收入重新分配政府收入。相比之下，在没有其他经济激励措施的情况下，实施了更舒适或生产力的技术进步（例如，自动驾驶汽车）可能会导致社会福利的改善。