在本文中,我们开发了一个包括代表立法机关的公共选择机制的模型,以表明在分配决策领域,系统地将公共决定偏向于更大的项目。By distribu- tive policies we mean those projects, programs, and grants that con- centrate the benefits in geographically specific constituencies, while spreading their costs across all constituencies through generalized taxation.2 This collection of public decisions includes the traditional pork barrel of public works and rivers and harbors projects as well as the more recent examples of highway construction, categorical grants-in-aid, urban renewal, mass transit, and污水处理厂。该模型确定了效率偏见的政治来源,并且有几个将民主机构拆除到其组成部分中,从而关注每个人的影响。这采用了从效率基准开始的模型进展的形式。然后,逐一添加政治特征,直到最终形式模型代表立法机关分为n个地区。该方法显示了政治机构如何将成本和收益的经济基础转化为政治成本和收益。后者,而不是他们的经济同行,为政治行为者定义了理性的决定。